Sharp Power and ‘Red Media’

In the midst of rising tensions between China and Taiwan, persistent Chinese ‘sharp power’ influence over Taiwanese traditional news media poses a direct and existential threat to Taiwan’s democracy. As one of Asia’s leading democracies, it is imperative that Taiwan maintains pluralism, freedom of speech, and transparent information flows within its borders.

The challenges faced by Taiwan are severe. A Financial Times investigation in 2019 revealed that Taiwanese media giant Want Want China Times Group—owner of several large Taiwanese media organizations—has received upwards of US$70 million in subsidies from the Chinese government, in addition to attending media summits on the mainland hosted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ¹.

Furthermore, due to the murky nature of the subsidies, it is difficult to differentiate between legitimate investment and covert Chinese media influence ². Lastly, the politicization of the fight against Chinese-funded ‘red media’—not to mention the politicization of the affected news media itself—has hampered efforts to root out the problem ³.

To be certain, foreign disinformation and subversion has reached unprecedented levels in democracies across the world, and Taiwan is not alone in many of the challenges it faces. The covert nature of Chinese influence in Taiwan’s news is similar to Chinese ‘United Front’ news media influence in other places in the region and world ⁴, and Taiwan can and should take inspiration from their peers’ experiences in resisting subversion and disinformation from abroad.

However, due to the unique cultural, trade, and geographical proximity of Taiwan to mainland China, and the two nations’ huge economic, military, and population disparities, the threat to Taiwan from Chinese-funded news media is far more acute than the threat from propaganda and disinformation faced by other democracies. Additionally, due to the pluralism foundational to all democracies, the Taiwanese political system is inherently vulnerable to division due to partisan action from outside actors. By supporting partisan news media in Taiwan, China seeks to use “divide and conquer tactics” not only to tarnish the image of Taiwan as a whole, but to drive a wedge between all its inhabitants ⁵.

In order to stave off Chinese propaganda and influence in its news media, Taiwan needs to take a multi-pronged, pluralistic approach to uphold information transparency and freedom of speech on the island:

1. Structural Transparency: Whether it means auditing media conglomerates, publicizing names of shareholders, or mandating identification of foreign-influenced news media ⁶, transparency on all levels must be a priority.
2. Holistic Information Literacy: The Taiwanese government needs to broadly improve information literacy of the Taiwanese people, with an emphasis on traditional media, as opposed to solely focusing on online disinformation and propaganda.
3. Depoliticization of Security: The DPP and KMT must avoid further entrenching partisanship surrounding Chinese news media influence. Chinese media subversion should be seen as a threat to the whole of Taiwanese society, and should not become a political issue to either ignore or hold over the opposition.

Only when the whole of Taiwanese democracy is united against the present threat, will Taiwan be able to neutralize the danger posed to its freedom of speech and information by China.

Chinese information warfare and dissemination of propaganda abroad has always posed a threat to global democracy, as evidenced by international concerns over Chinese-owned ByteDance’s TikTok social media network ⁷, or the countless instances of Chinese diplomats suppressing factual information either online or through embassies abroad ⁸. However, Chinese influence over Taiwanese traditional news media is unparalleled compared to anywhere else in the world.

While the extent of Chinese investment in Taiwanese news media is hard to discern from the outside, the case of Want Want China Times Group (Want Want) is a clear example of Chinese meddling in action. Originally a Taiwanese food industry company with 90% of its revenue generated in China ⁹, Want Want Group first acquired Taiwanese news channel CTV in 2006, then media giant China Times group in 2008, merging with the Taiwanese broadcaster to become Want Want China Times Group ¹⁰. Since creating their media conglomerate, various sources have accused Want Want Group of taking significant subsidies from the Chinese government, with some figures as high as US$500 million ¹¹.

At the same time, there was also a noticeable shift in Want Want-owned broadcasters’ reporting. After the takeover by Want Want, China Times’ reporting on human rights in China abruptly fell from 350 articles a year to under 100, and failed entirely to cover the 2014 pro-democracy “Umbrella Movement” in Hong Kong ¹². On the television front, Want Want’s CTi News neglected to report on the 2019 Hong Kong protests or Beijing’s treatment of Uighurs ¹³, and showed Taiwan as part of China on a map in the background of a 2019 news report ¹⁴.

Meanwhile, CTiTV was fined NT$200,000 and NT$400,000 respectively for reporting on an “auspicious cloud” hovering over KMT politicians, and for dedicating more than 70% of airtime to promoting KMT mayoral candidate Han Kuo-yu ¹⁵.

In order to understand how such extreme journalistic changes took place in Taiwanese media, it is necessary to look behind the scenes at the people producing and publishing news in Taiwan. According to an anonymous reporter interviewed in a Reuters investigation into some of Taiwan’s biggest media groups, self-censorship is nearly unavoidable when receiving such large amounts of funding from the Chinese government ¹⁶.

Additionally, journalists at Want Want-owned China Times and CTiTV share that editorial managers take instructions directly from China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), with whom they remain in constant communication ¹⁷. In an extreme example, two feature articles discussing Chinese tourism and business opportunities were even edited by the TAO before being sent to Taiwan for publication ¹⁸.

Despite the fact Want Want’s founder Tsai Eng-meng denies instructing employees how to report on the news ¹⁹, he has nonetheless led several delegations to annual media summits in Beijing since 2015 ²⁰. At one of these summits, Tsai and other members were said to be seen smiling and laughing as CCP Politburo Standing Committee member Wang Yang mocked the Taiwanese government ²¹. Participants also signed bilateral cooperation agreements with China, and were urged to uphold the 1992 Consensus, peaceful reunification, and the One China Principle ²².

The duality of Tsai Eng-meng’s actions and words—denying influencing Taiwanese news media, yet personally leading media delegations to CCP-led summits in China—highlights the murky and often clandestine nature of Chinese ‘sharp power’ influence within Taiwanese media organizations. During an eight-and-a-half hour investigative hearing into Want Want by Taiwan’s National Communications Commission (NCC), Tsai Eng-meng deflected accusations regarding the millions of dollars received in Chinese subsidies, stating that all companies in China—even American and Japanese ones—were also eligible.

The near-unprovability of Tsai’s claim is emblematic of China’s ‘sharp power’ approach to influence online discourse and news media worldwide. Under this sharp power approach, a regime covertly manipulates and coerces actors in targeted countries, with the goal of sowing confusion and disinformation abroad ²³. This situation is clearly playing out in Taiwan, where, unlike with China-branded CGTN news stations in over 140 countries ²⁴, consumers believe they are being presented with straight, unbiased news, having no clear way to discern what news sources are funded by China ²⁵.

In reference to the pro-China articles edited by the TAO before publishing, an anonymous reporter said “[r]eaders were unable to tell the stories were paid for [by the CCP]…[a]ll they could see was positive coverage of the mainland” ²⁶. This deniability and covertness in funding news media is the nexus of the problem faced by the Taiwanese people and government. It not only allows Chinese disinformation to propagate on the island in the first place, but also makes any effort to firmly resist partisanship induced by Chinese ‘divide and conquer’ tactics exponentially more difficult.

Due to the overwhelming KMT bias in Chinese-funded news media in Taiwan, KMT politicians have resisted acknowledging the extent of Chinese ‘United Front’ investment in Taiwanese mainstream media. As more and more accusations of collusion and media subsidization from China are leveled against KMT-leaning organizations, KMT politicians are constantly put on the defensive. Existing as the minority party under an increasingly popular DPP-led government, direct KMT acknowledgement of CCP cooperation and investment in their news media would be paramount to handing the next election cycle to the DPP.

Accordingly, KMT politicians frequently downplay the extent of the threat faced from China, with KMT-aligned policy analyst Eric Huang claiming that Taiwanese voters are accustomed to subjective mainstream news media, and that citizens view information coming from China as entertainment ²⁷. Hard evidence supporting this claim is lacking, and Huang completely disregards the fact that even if Taiwanese voters view Chinese information as ‘entertainment’, they currently have no way of knowing if any one source of information originated from China or not.

Similar smoke and mirrors were cast by Tsai Eng-meng when questioned about Chinese investment and influence in Want Want China Times Group, with the founder denying Chinese special treatment, distancing himself from the group’s day-to-day activities, and claiming to only be acting as a platform for cross-strait communication ²⁸. Tsai’s lawyer also laid the blame for the drama surrounding Want Want Group on unfair political bias from the public, rather than the veracity of its news reports ²⁹.

On the other side of the coin, DPP politicization of Chinese media influence has only served to fulfill China’s sharp power objectives. While KMT denial of the problem is undeniably harmful to Taiwanese democracy, the DPP’s current approach does little to solve the problem, and on the contrary deepens the domestic political divide. In a May 2019 Legislative Yuan intelligence briefing regarding Chinese influence in Taiwanese media, DPP legislator Lo Chih-cheng asked the intelligence official if he “dared” to name the news outlets under investigation ³⁰.

After thousands of Taiwanese publicly protested against growing Chinese “red media” inroads on the island, the DPP reportedly looked to capitalize on voter fears in upcoming elections, starting by organizing public forums discussing red media influence ³¹. Although the Taiwanese people have every right to know the specifics of the National Security Bureau’s findings, and opening dialogue around Chinese “red media” is absolutely a step in the right direction, the DPP must carefully consider in what role it is exposing Chinese influence.

As Taiwan’s leading party at the time of writing, the DPP-led government’s responsibility to the Taiwanese people must come before party affiliations and election concerns. In politicizing red media influence instead of making it a national issue, the DPP thus forces the KMT—however culpable it may be—to dig in its heels and continue downplaying the problem. As exploiting rifts between political parties is a key tenet of China’s ‘sharp power’ approach ³², so long as the DPP continues using red media influence as a partisan campaign issue, Chinese ‘United Front’ investment will continue dividing Taiwanese political society.

If progress is to be made in resolving Taiwan’s red media problem, total transparency on all levels will be paramount. First and foremost, the Taiwanese government should move forward with legislation that would require news channels to disclose their advertisers, and require shareholders with at least 10% stakes in companies to disclose any and all businesses they own ³³. This is an important first step in the process, as it pulls back the curtain on the millions in covert funding provided by the CCP under the current system. This would also make it far more difficult for business executives such as Tsai Eng-meng to operate Taiwanese media groups under the guise of editorial impartiality.

While China is a sophisticated adversary when it comes to disinformation and dissemination of propaganda, adopting this news-disclosure measure would make China’s job far more difficult and come at minimal cost to the Taiwanese government. In the case of the 70-strong media delegations led by Tsai to Beijing, this measure could reveal as-of-yet unknown funding sources and business connections.

A further low-cost transparency measure which the Taiwanese government should pursue is to require both print and television news outlets to identify all articles that are paid for entirely by or receive a majority of funding from foreign sources. Taiwan would not be the first to mandate such measures; the United States will occasionally require certain broadcasters to register as foreign agents, and the Australian Foreign Influence Transparency law from 2018 requires all foreign content to be identified ³⁴.

In response to likely criticism that this would constitute state censorship and an infringement on freedom of speech, identifying foreign funding would only enhance freedom of speech, not restrict it. Under this model, all foreign publishers, friend or foe—even those with blatant links to China—would still maintain their freedom to publish in Taiwan, with the only change being improved news media transparency for the Taiwanese public.

Going hand-in-hand with ensuring media transparency, the Taiwanese government must prioritize information literacy among the citizenry, with a focus on both online and traditional media. As Taiwan and China share the same language and a shared cultural background, China knows the mentality of Taiwanese thinking, and can more easily produce disinformation as a result ³⁵. Despite some critics saying Taiwanese are already accustomed to subjective news and know to question the veracity of all media ³⁶, when faced with concerted Chinese manipulation efforts inherited from the Mao-era propaganda system ³⁷, Taiwan must err on the side of caution, and provide the people with every opportunity to discern truth from fiction.

Critically, Taiwan must focus on retroactively educating older demographics, while also highlighting the risk of disinformation in traditional media, as opposed to only emphasizing the dangers of online propaganda. Since 2018, Taiwanese schoolchildren have been educated on how to spot propaganda and properly decipher the source of news information ³⁸. This will be essential to safeguarding journalistic integrity and freedom of speech down the road, but Taiwan also faces pressing threats in the near-term which must be guarded against.

For many older Taiwanese on the island, their education and upbringing took place entirely during the authoritarian martial law era, meaning that even after Taiwan’s democratic transition, they have still not formally learned how to critically assess and consult a plurality of sources. In order to effectively target this demographic, the government should publish public service announcements in both newspaper and television publications, both to reach these audiences with limited internet experience ³⁹, and also to drive home the disinformation risk from traditional media.

Third and finally, Taiwan should frame Chinese red media infiltration as a shared matter of national security, and not a partisan issue to either cover up or exploit. As discussed previously, when KMT politicians deny the gravity of red media influence, and the DPP turns public fears into a campaign issue, both sides play into China’s hands by falling for Chinese ‘divide and conquer’ tactics ⁴⁰. On the other hand, if both parties stand together in opposition to Chinese sharp power tactics in their media, China loses all of the power and influence behind its efforts.

Although democracy is inherently vulnerable to being divided from within, when pluralism is accepted and shared values are upheld, a democratic nation can withstand disproportionate outside influence—even when threatened by a neighbor 60 times its size. In addition to KMT and DPP unity in opposition to Chinese manipulation, civil society should also make itself heard. Taiwanese NGOs should investigate, name, and resist red media influence on the island wherever it appears.

Empowering whistleblowers, NGOs and voters to resist disinformation in Taiwan gives the people a non-partisan outlet for their anger and frustration instead of simply protesting against the opposition party. With this being said, protests should always be allowed, and protesters’ voices should absolutely be heard. Therefore, the government should encourage ordinary Taiwanese to participate in national discourse, whether through encouraging them to publish their own news media, or giving them a platform in national forums or news channels. When facing such powerful and acute disinformation threats from abroad, more voices are the answer, not less.

In its pursuit of truth in its domestic media and freedom in its region, Taiwan faces steep challenges from Chinese sharp power and “red media” influence. Prominent KMT-aligned, pro-China media conglomerates such as Want Want China Times Media Group, receive millions of dollars in subsidies from the Chinese Communist Party, and attend media summits hosted by top Communist Party officials in Beijing. In exchange, these Taiwanese broadcasters and publishers give the CCP direct editorial oversight over their operations, leading to KMT and China-biased coverage, and suppression of news regarding Chinese treatment of Uighurs or pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong.

Furthermore, due to the covert nature of Chinese government involvement in Taiwanese media, it is often difficult to directly prove Chinese influence as opposed to private investment in media outlets. This makes it nearly impossible for Taiwanese citizens to know the true source of any information they see in the news, while also creating a political battlefield of accusations and denials between the KMT and DPP. Partisanship and polarization in Taiwan as a result of disputes over red media is directly out of the Chinese ‘sharp power’ playbook, and weakens Taiwanese democracy as a whole. When the KMT and DPP are working against each other instead of resisting Chinese media manipulation together, every cent China covertly invests into Taiwanese media only serves to further divide Taiwan.

In order to triumph against the odds and fully remove red media influence from Taiwan, media transparency legislation will be key. All foreign revenue streams must be disclosed and investigated, including secondary business ownerships of key shareholders. The Taiwanese people should also be able to see where their news comes from, with foreign-funded stories and articles clearly marked. Next, information literacy in Taiwan should continue to be prioritized, not just for current students online, but also for older generations consuming traditional news media, who have never been educated under a democratic government. Lastly, the passion and voice of the Taiwanese people should be reframed as a national outcry against censorship and media manipulation, instead of being used to drive domestic partisanship on the island. Rather than being divided and weakened by Chinese sharp power, Taiwan has every opportunity to change the narrative, and, through pluralism and freedom of speech, make its populace smarter, its media clearer, and its democracy stronger.